Maryland Law Review
Volume 22 | Issue 2

Article 4

The Federal Estate Tax And Sale Of A Retained Life
Estate In Contemplation Of Death - United States
v. Allen
Thomas J.S. Waxter Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Taxation-Federal Estate and Gift Commons
Recommended Citation
Thomas J. Waxter Jr., The Federal Estate Tax And Sale Of A Retained Life Estate In Contemplation Of Death - United States v. Allen, 22 Md.
L. Rev. 131 (1962)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol22/iss2/4

This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Comments and Casenotes
The Federal Estate Tax And 'Sale Of A Retained Life
Estate In Contemplation 'Of Death
United States v. Allen'
Settlor-decedent in May, 1932, created an irrevocable,
inter vivos trust, reserving three-fifths of the income for
her life, the remainder upon her death to pass to two of
her children who were the beneficiaries of the other twofifths of the trust income. After being advised in 1949
that the reservation of the life estate in the trust would
result in three-fifths of the trust corpus being included
within her gross estate for federal estate tax purposes, the
settlor-decedent in 1950, at the age of seventy-eight, transferred her life estate, which at the time of sale was valued
at approximately $135,000, to her son who paid $140,000
therefor. The son, who was not a beneficiary under the
trust and who had a mere expectancy of inheritance from
his mother, believed that his mother would live long
enough to return him a profit on his investment. Although
the settlor-decedent was in relatively good health at the
time of the transfer, shortly thereafter she contracted an
incurable disease which within a few months resulted in
her death, causing her son to suffer a considerable loss on
his investment.
The Commission of Internal Revenue determined that
three-fifths of the trust corpus, which was the principal in
which decedent had reserved the life estate, and which
was worth approximately $900,000 at her death, was includible in her gross estate, less the $140,000 which she
had received from the transfer to her son. Plaintiff-executors paid the deficiency assessment, and following disallowance of their refund claim, brought this refund action
in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado. The District Judge2 found that the 1950 transfer
of the reserved life estate was in contemplation of death
but that the consideration received by the decedent was
adequate and full for the interest transferred, thus serving
to divest the decedent of any interest in the trust and tak'293 F. 2d 916 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. den. 368 U.S. 944 (1961).
2 District Judge A. Sherman Christenson, sitting by special assignment in
the District Court for the District of Colorado, delivered an oral opinion
which was not reported.
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ing the attributable share of the corpus out of the gross
estate. On appeal, the Court of Appeals3 for the Tenth
Circuit reversed, reasoning that while the consideration
was adequate and full for the life estate, indeed more than
its actual value, Congress could not have intended to permit such easy avoidance of the tax consequences incident
to reserved life estates. The Court of Appeals held that
full and adequate consideration, sufficient to eliminate the
tax consequences of the reserved life estate, must be consideration adequate to compensate for the amount the gross
estate would be depleted by the transfer, and not merely a
consideration adequate for the life estate which was the
subject of the transfer. A concurring opinion was filed by
Judge Breitenstein in which by a literal interpretation of
the statute, he found that the tax liability arose upon the
creation of the reserved life estate in the trust, and while
acknowledging that the life estate could be subsequently
transferred, he concluded that such a sale could not reduce
the tax consequences which arose upon the creation of the
reserved life interest.
Since the decendent died prior to the effective date4
of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code (IRC), the decision in
the instant case was controlled by Section 811, specifically
811 (c) (1) (A) and (c) (1) (B), 5 of the 1939 IRC. As the
1954 IRC has made no substantive changes in these subsections of Section 811,6 the Court's reasoning is also applicable to estates governed by the 1954 Code.
3The opinion was written by Chief Judge Alfred P. Murrah and was
joined in by Judge Sam G. Bratton.
'The estate tax provisions of Chapter 11 of the 1954 IRC apply to estates
of decedents dying after August 16, 1954. IRC of 1954, § 7851 (a) (2) (A),
68 A. Stat. 919 (1954).
"§ 811. Gross estate
"The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined
by including the value at the time of his death of all property * * * "(c) Transfers in contemplation of, or taking effect at, death
"(1) General rule. To the extent of any Interest therein of which
the decedenit has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a
bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth), by trust or otherwise "(A) in contemplation of his death; or
"(B) under which he has retained for his life * * * (i) the
possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income
from, the property * * * ." IRC of 1939, § 811 (c), (26
U.S.C.A. (1955) § 811(c)).
8
IRC of 1939, subsections 811 (c)(1)(A) and 811 (c) (1) (B), were
recodified in IRC of 1954 as § 2035 and § 2036 respectively. The House
and Senate Reports confirm that no substantive changes in these sulbsections were intended by the recodification. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Oong.,
2nd Sess., p. A. 314, 3 U.S. Code Gong. & Adm. News, p. 4457 (1954) ; Sen.
Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 469, 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm.
News, pp. 5112, 5113 (1954).
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Under Section 811 (c) (1) (B),1 by reserving the life
interest in the 1932 trust,8 three-fifths of the corpus, valued
at the date of decedent's death,' clearly would be includible
within the decedent's gross estate, had there been no subsequent transfer of the life estate.
Judge Breitenstein, in his concurring opinion, concluded that once the decedent had reserved the life estate,
she could not by a subsequent transfer thereof divest the
gross estate of three-fifths of the trust corpus. This result
may be reached by giving literal effect to the language of
811 (c) (1) (B) which includes "any interest * * * under
which he [decedent] has retained for life or for any period
not ascertainable without reference to his death or for
any period which does not in fact end before his death...
the right to income from, the property * * *."Comparing
this wording with that of the revocable transfer subsection,
811 (d),1O which includes interests transferred "where the
enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death to
any change * * "11 it is possible to conclude that "retained"
in subsection 811 (c) (1) (B) means retained at the time
of the transfer, not retained at the time of death, thus
directing the conclusion that once a reserved life estate has
been created, no subsequent transfer will remove the
corpus thereof from the gross estate. Such an interpretation is not, however, consistent with the purpose of the
estate tax provisions which seek basically to prevent tax
"Supra, n. 5.
IRC of 1939, § 811 (c), (now IRC of 1954, § 2036 (a)) as amended by
the Technical Changes Act of 1949, Ch. 720, § 7 (a), 63 STAT. 894 (1949),
provides that § 811 (c) (1) (B), shall nbt apply to retained life estates
created before March 4, 1931, or to retained life estates created after March
3, 1931, and before June 7, 1932, unless the property would have been includible under the language of the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931 (46
STAT. 1516 (1931)). As the reserved life estate was created in May, 1932.
and fell within the language of the Joint Resolution (46 STAT. 1516
(1931)), it came within Section 811 (c) (1) (B). See Estate of Robert J.
Cuddihy, 32 T.C. 1171 (1959) for discussion of the estate tax consequences
of reserved life estates prior to and subsequent to 1931.
9 IRC of 1939, § 811, supra, n. 5, provides for valuation as of the date
of deaith (now IRC of 1954, § 2031 (a)). The "value" of the property includible in the gross estate is that portion of the corpus in which the
decedent reserved a life interest. See McNichol's Estate v. C.I.R., 265 F. 2d
667 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. den. 361 U.S. 829 (1959) and Estate of Robert J.
Cuddihy, id., 26 C.F.R. (1961) § 20.2036-1 (a) (ii) provides:
"If the decedent retained or reserved an interest or right with respect
to a part only of the property transferred by him, the amount to be
included in his gross estate under section 2036 is only a corresponding
portion of the amount described [entire corpus] ....
10 Now, IRC of 1954, § 2038.
8

Emphasis supplied.
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avoidance by taxing inter
vivos transfers which have testa12
mentary characteristics.
Considering this purpose together with the contemplation of death presumptions13 and the contemplation of
death subsection, a subsequent transfer of the reserved
life estate, which is not in contemplation of death and under which the transferor retains no interest thereafter,
should effectively divest the gross estate of the trust corpus. Since the contemplation of death subsection 4 and the
statutory presumptions thereof 15 are not limited to any
particular interests, 6 and as the purpose of the estate tax
is consistent with the application of the contemplation of
death provisions to the transfer of reserved life interests,
compliance with these provisions may properly serve to
remove trust corpus, otherwise includible, from inclusion
in the gross estate. Thus, had the decedent transferred her
life estate more than three years prior to her death, the
three-fifths of the corpus otherwise includible within the
gross estate would have been removed therefrom."
The District Judge found, however, that the 1950 transfer of decedent's life estate was made in contemplation of
death," and this finding was not objected to on the appeal.
The Internal Revenue Service had previously ruled that
a gratuitous transfer of a reserved life estate in contemplation of death does not prevent the corpus, otherwise in'2In Belvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 112 (1940) the Supreme Court
adopted the following reasoning:
"[T]he statute taxes not merely those interests which are deemed to
pass at death according to refined technicalities of the law of property.
It also taxes inter tivos transfers that are too much akin to testamentary dispositions not to be subjected to the same excise."
IRC of 1939, § 811 (1) (now IRC of 1954, § 2035 (b)), added by Ch. 994,
Title V, § 501 (a), 64 STAT. 962 (1950), provides that if a transfer is made
prior to three years before decedent's death, the transfer is not in contemplation of death, but that if the transfer is within the three year
period, it shall, unless shown otherwise, be deemed to have been in contemplation of death.
14 Supra, n. 5.
11Supra, n. 13.
11IRC of 1939, § (L), 8upra, n. 13, applies inter alia, to transfers of
interests in property.
11For discussion of this point, see: Lowndes, Cutting the "String8" on
Inter Vivos Transfers in Contemplation of Death, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 57,
58-59 (1958) ; In Re Thurston's Estate, 36 Cal. 2d 207, 223 P. 2d 12 (1950).
11IRC of 1939, § 811 (c) (1) (A), supra, n. 5, and (1), supra, n. 13, (now
IRC of 1954, § 2035). For discussion of the contemplation of death provisions and their application to various factual situations, see Low~nxs
AND KRAmER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiEt TAXEs (1956), pp. 64-83; 148
A.L.R. 1051 et seq. (1944).
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cludible, from inclusion in the gross estate. 19 In the instant case, however, the decedent did not gratuitously
transfer her life interest but instead sold it for $140,000.
The issue thus posed was whether this sale was "a bona
fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth,"20 and as such effectively removed the
corpus from the gross estate.
Generally, the exemption for bona fide sales for adequate and full consideration, found in several of the estate
tax sections, 2 is to avoid double taxation, i.e., to prevent
taxing the interest transferred as well as the consideration

received therefor.2 2 To qualify for this exception the transfer must, (1) be made for money or money's worth, (2) be
a bona fide sale and, in addition, (3) the consideration must

be full and adequate.
While the estate tax sections of the IRC do not define
these terms, except to state in Section 811 (m) 2 that
marital rights are not deemed consideration for "money
or money's worth," there is no question that the payment

of $140,000 met the requirement of "money or money's
worth." There was, however, more question whether this
was a "bona fide sale." Since the decedent relinquished

her entire claim to the life interest in return for a lump
sum payment, as opposed to receiving periodic installment
payments which would suggest a sub rosa agreement
whereby the transferee-son might have agreed to take over
the payment of his mother's life income, this was not a
sham transaction, but a sale.2 4 Although the issue of
1"Revenue Ruling 56-324, 1956 - Cum. Bull. 999, after quoting from two
decisions which had construed local statutes similar to the federal statute,
concluded that a gratuitous transfer of a reserved life interest in contemplaition of death, did not prevent the inclusion of the corpus in the
gross estate; i.e., for tax purposes such a transfer was to be treated as if
the decedent had retained the life interest until death. See also, 26 C.F.R.
(1961) § 20.2035-1 (b).
Supra, n. 5.
21In addition to the exception under § 811 (c) (1), supra, n. 5, (now
IRC of 1954, §§ 2035, 2036), the exception also appears in other subsections of 811, which are now recodified in IRC of 1954 as, § 2037 (transfers
taking effect at death), § 2038 (revocable transfers); § 2040 (joint interests), and incorporated by reference in § 2041 (powers of appointment)
and § 2043 (transfers for insufficient consideration). The exception also
appears in the deduction subsections of 'the 1939 IRC, now codified in the
1954 IRC as § 2053 (c) (1) (A), and § 2056 (b) (1) (A).
LowNDES AND KRAMER, op. cit. supra, n. 18, pp. 310-311.
2Now codified in the IRC of 1954, as § 2043 (b).
"Where decedent-transferor unequivocably severs his interest in the
trust, by transferring his life estate, even to his children, and receiving
therefor a lump sum equivalent to the value of the interest transferred,
the transfer is deemed to be a transfer of a capital asset. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) ; Estate of Robert J. Cuddihy, 32 T.C. 1171
(1939). However, where, in substance the transferor merely exchanges
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whether the sale is bona fide has been held to be inextricably bound with the question of whether the consideration was adequate and full,2 5 the sale was not lacking in
2
bona fides because the decedent's son was the transferee 0
or because the sale was made27 for the purpose of reducing
the decedent's taxable estate.
The dispositive issue thus becomes whether to meet
the test of adequate and full consideration, the consideration moving to the decedent-transferor must be adequate
and full for the interest transferred or adequate and full
for the amount that the gross estate will be depleted due
to the transfer. No federal cases 28 were found presenting
the construction of the full consideration exception with
respect to sales of reserved life estates in contemplation
of death, but prior to the instant case other courts had construed the full consideration exception with respect to
other interests transferred in contemplation of death.
In Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,2 9 decedent and his wife held property as joint tenants,
decedent having paid the consideration therefor, which
under Section 811 (e)08 would have resulted in the full
his interest for a substitution of future income flowing from the transferee,
the Courts will strike down the purported transfer as a sham transaction.
McNichol's Estate v. C.I.R., 265 F. 2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. den., 361
U.S. 829 (1959) ; Harter v. United States, (N.D. Okla.), decided December
29, 1954, 48 A.F.T.R. 1964, 1955-1 U.S.T.C., 503.
Estate of Frank K. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961 (1948), rev'd 175 F. 2d 657
(9th Cir. 1949).
'While there is authority under the Gift Tax that the sale to be bona
fide must be an "arm's length" transaction, 26 C.F.R. (1961), § 25.2512-8,
Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.1S. 303, 306 (1945), and while the Gift Tax
provisions and the Regulations thereunder have had some influence upon
the construction of the estate tax sections, Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308
(1945), sales between family members under both the gift and estate tax
sections have not been held lacking in bona fides, where the consideration
received by the transferor was of the quality and quantity which would
result from arms-length bargaining, e.g., Peoples First National Bank &
Tr. Co. v. United States, 241 F. 2d 420 (3d Cir. 1957) ; Sullivan's Estate v.
Commissioner of Internal Rev., 175 F. 2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949); Gladys
Cheesman Evans, 30 T.C. 798 (1958).
- In Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935), the Supreme Court
stated, "The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what
otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which
the law permits, cannot be doubted." See also, Gladys Cheesman Evans, id.
2In Re Thurston's Estate, 36 Cal. 2d 207, 223 P. 2d 12, 17 (1950),
although involving state inheritance taxes, contains dictum on lpoint which
supports the Commissioner's contention. The California Court of Appeals,
by Traynor, J., stated, "A tax measured by the value of the entire corpus
transferred cannot be avoided by the payment of a consideration equal
to the value 'of the interest relinquished."
'175 F. 2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949).
3 IRC of 1939, § 811 (e) (now IRC of 1954, § 2040), provides that an
interest held in joint tenancy, which had originally been acquired by one
of the tenants and which has not subsequently been transferred for full
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value of the property being included in decedent-husband's
gross estate. In contemplation of death, the decedent and
his wife converted their joint tenancy into a tenancy in
common. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
in reversing the Tax Court, held that the transfer, although
in contemplation of death, was within the full consideration exception of Section 811 (c) (1), resulting in the inclusion in the gross estate of only the decedent's interest
as a tenant in common. The Court of Appeals in arriving
at their decision, inter alia, rejected the Commissioner's
contention that the consideration was not adequate and
full since it was not the equivalent of the extent to which
the gross estate would be depleted by the transfer, and
held that, as the consideration moving to decedent was the
equivalent of the property value he transferred, the test
of full and adequate consideration in Section 811 (c) (1)
had been complied with. The Sullivan case's construction
of the full consideration exception has been adhered to
3 ' and has received the Commisin the joint tenancy field
32
sioner's acquiescence.
The Sullivan rationale has not, however, been restricted
to the joint tenancy field but has been applied in the construction of the full and adequate consideration exception
with respect to other interests. 3 Thus, prior to the decision in the instant case the test was whether the consideration received was adequate for the interest transferred, not whether it was adequate for the amount the
gross estate would be depleted by the transfer.
As the full and adequate consideration exception apparently applies to transfers of reserved life estates, it can
be argued that the common sense meaning of adequate and
and adequate consideration in money or money's worth, is includible in
full in the original payor's gross estate.
"Baltimore National Bank v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 642 (D. Md.
1955), applied to stock held as tenants by entirety; Estate of Edward
Carnall, 25 T.C. 654 (1955) applied to stock held as tenants by entirety;
Estate of Don Murillo Brockway, 18 T.C. 488 (1952), aff'd on other
grounds, 219 F. 2d 400 (9th Cir. 1954) applied to realty held as joint
tenants.
After contesting the Sullivan holding for some time, the Commissioner
acquiesced in Estate of Don Murillo Brockway, id., 1955 - 2 Cum. Bull. 4.
8 Estate of -John M. Goetchius, 17 T.C. 495 (1951) while holding that
the decedent had not received full consideration for the transfer of his
annuity contracts, nevertheless looked to whether the consideration was
the equivalent of the property transferred; Estate of James Stuart
Pritchard, 4 T.C. 204 (1944) held that as transferor had more valuable
incidents of ownership in his life insurance policies than their cash surrender value, consideration received by him equivalent only to the cash
surrender value was not full and adequate to remove the insurance proceeds from the gross estate.
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full consideration is that which a buyer would be willing
to pay for the interest transferred. Since virtually no one
would be willing to pay approximately $900,000 (the extent to which the gross estate would be depleted by the
transfer) for a life interest worth $135,000, the argument
concludes that the only meaning which is consistent with
the presence of the exception in Section 811 (c) (1), is
that the consideration
must only be adequate for the in3 4
terest transferred.
The primary objection to adopting the Sullivan rationale
and its property law concept in the instant case is a practical one. It would open up a major loophole under the
federal estate tax provisions, whereby a tax-conscious decedent could enjoy the benefits of his retained life estate
and then shortly prior to his death, transfer it for the de
minimus consideration it would then be worth, thus effectively removing the corpus
from which his income flowed,
35
from his gross estate.
While the insertion of the full and adequate consideration exception was to prevent double taxation, not present
in the instant case, by including the corpus in the gross
estate, the conclusion appears obvious that the estate tax
sections, not adequately providing for the facts presented
by the instant controversy, were saved from the possible
loophole existing therein by the liberal construction indulged in by the Tenth Circuit. As the Tenth Circuit concluded, "It does not seem plausible . . . that Congress intended to allow such an easy avoidance of the taxable incidence befalling reserved life estates."3 6
Although it is possible that other courts may not adhere to the Tenth Circuit's construction, the result reached
8 NT4te also that "adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth", appears in the Gift Tax, IRC of 1939, § 1002, (now IRC Of 1954,
§ 2512 (b)), and that there is authority, Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308
1945), for construing like terms in the Gift and Estate Tax Sections
similarly. As consideration in money equal to the interest transferred is
sufficient to prevent the imposition of the gift tax, another argument is
presented, appearing to favor application of the property law concept
urged by plaintiff-executors. But cf. the language of Commissioner v.
Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 307-308 (1945), which would appear to add support
to the Commissioner's contention.
' LOWNDES AND KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES
(1956), pp.
314-317, discusses and recognizes the Sullivan case as representing this
possible loophole; Lowndes, Cutting the "Strings" on Inter Vivos Transfers In Contemplation of Death, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 57, 68-71 (1958), also
discusses the practical effects of an application of the Sullivan doctrine,
concluding as does ithe Tenth Circuit, that to prevent the loophole, consideration should be construed to mean consideration sufficient to prevent
depletion of the gross estate, rather than consideration sufficient for the
interest transferred.
United States v. Allen, supra, n. 1, 918.
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in the instant case will go far towards discouraging any
realistic hope that decedents may avoid the tax conse37
quences of their reserved life estates by death-bed sales.
THOMAS J. S.

WAXTER, JR.

Creation Of A Trust On Insurance Proceeds By The
Use Of Precatory Expressions In A
Testamentary Instrument
Waesche v. Rizzuto'
The appellants, trustees named under the last will and
testament of the decedent, were sued by the appellee,
sister of the testator's wife and member of the testator's
household, to have the court construe and enforce a testamentary trust allegedly created by the will. The residuary
clause provided for the establishment of a trust fund and
further provided that it was the testator's "will and desire"
that his trustees make arrangements to assure the adequate
support of the appellee, among others, from the trust fund
so created. The testator then declared:
"[R]ealizing it is beyond my power by this will and
testament to do so, but relying upon faith and confidence in my trustees [who were named in the insurance policy as beneficiaries] that they will comply
with my desires, it is my wish that, upon my death,
87 Note that after the Tenth Circuit held that the $900,000 corpus was
within the gross estate, the $140,000 consideration paid for the life interest
was deducted therefrom. This result is based upon a construction of IRC
of 1939, Section 811 (i), (now IRC of 1954, § 2043), which provides for
the event that insufficient consideration is received and states that, "- * *
there shall be included in the gross estate only the excess of the fair
market value at the time of death of the property otherwise to be included on account of such transaction, over the value of the consideration
received therefore by the decedent." The wording of this section is unclear
as applied to transfers of reserved life estates, but it is submitted that this
section does not warrant a reduction of the $900,000 figure once it is
determined it is includible in the gross estate. The section appears to
apply where the decedent h'as received less than he transferred away,
with the term property 'otherwise to be included" intending to refer to
property transferred away. Here there was no transfer of the $900,000
corpus, and the consideration was for the life interest only. It appears
that in this situation Section 811 (i) contemplates that the $900,000 is
includible and that as much of the $140,000 as decedent has not spent by
the time of her death is also includible, as an addition to rather than a
deduction from the includible corpus.
'224 Md. 573, 168 A. 2d 871 (1961).

